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ABSTRACT: Rāmānuja’s exegetical-theological 
struggles with the question as to whether his 
doctrine that the Lord Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the 
inner controller of the finite self dissolves 
moral autonomy remind us of one of the most 
vexed debates in Augustinian Christian 
theology – whether divine grace infallibly 
moves the predetermined soul to perform 
virtuous action, or whether divine grace is 
rendered efficacious by free human response. 
I suggest that Christian systematic theologians 
can profitably explore Rāmānuja’s integration 
of an emphasis on divine grace with an 
affirmation of human autonomy in his 
devotional universe. 
I begin with a deep theological paradox 
that structures the doctrinal systems of 
Christianity and various forms of devotional 
Vaiṣṇava Hinduisms – the simultaneous 
affirmation of divine sovereignty and human 
volitional response. On the one hand, God is 
not restricted in any way by the worldly 
structures over which God exercises sovereign 
control – a scriptural declaration which could 
suggest that human volitions too are 
subsumed into, and even negated by, divine 
agency. On the other hand, however, the 
uncoerced response of human beings to the 
divine self-revelation is regarded as a pivotal 
moment in their progressive overcoming of 
worldly imperfections. A survey of the 
religious histories of Christianity and 
Vaiṣṇava Vedānta indicates a series of 
polarised groups who have taken up 
embattled positions by highlighting one of 
these two theses over the other – for instance, 
the Ariminians versus the Calvinists, or Martin 
Luther versus Desiderius Erasmus in one 
context, and the Tengalais versus the 
Vaḍagalais in another. Our purpose in this 
essay is threefold: first, to highlight 
Rāmānuja’s attempts to hold together the two 
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‘moments’ of the Lord’s gracious help offered 
to the devotee and also the active response of 
the devotee; second, to indicate the contours 
of an Augustinian Christian resolution of this 
theological paradox; and third, to offer some 
reflections on what Christian theologians 
could learn through an engagement with 
Rāmānuja’s understanding of the divine 
presence. As we will see, the doctrine of 
production of the world and the doctrine of 
divine favour are mutually interrelated across 
Vaiṣṇava Hindu and Augustinian universes. 
For the later Augustine (411–430 CE), the key 
theological note is the utter incapability of 
human beings, who have a single lifetime on 
earth, to initiate even the first turn towards 
God, and he concludes that for those saints 
who are timelessly foreordained to receive 
salvation this initial conversio itself is 
prepared by God’s grace. In Rāmānuja, on the 
other hand, we do not encounter such 
theological anxieties relating to a specific 
temporally-locatable moment – certain 
human beings, through the fruition of their 
beginningless (anādi) stream of karmic merits, 
are beginning to move in this lifetime towards 
the Lord Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa who is constantly 
assisting them in their spiritual endeavours. 
The Either/Or dichotomy between ‘divine 
grace’ versus ‘human autonomy’ which 
appears with sharp contrasts in Augustine 
and, following him, in the Reformed doctrinal 
systems of theologians such as Calvin, is 
largely absent from Rāmānuja’s 
understanding of how structured human 
response and divine favour are mutually 
intertwined in the human spiritual 
pilgrimage.  
(A) 
The theological system of Rāmānuja, 
which intertwines dense layers of scriptural 
exegesis, reasoned discourse, and devotional 
experience, is structured by a dynamic 
polarity between divine transcendence over 
the world and divine accessibility to human 
interiority. The creative tension between 
‘transcendence’ and ‘immanence’ that 
Rāmānuja works with appears pointedly in the 
topic of whether his doctrine that the Lord 
Viṣṇu-Nārāyaṇa is the inner controller 
(antaryāmī) of the finite self dissolves human 
moral autonomy. According to Rāmānuja’s 
distinctive understanding of the term ‘body’ 
(śarīra), it is any substance which a conscious 
being is capable of completely controlling and 
supporting for its own purposes, and whose 
essential form (svarūpa) is to be the accessory 
of that being.1 Since the finite self, thus 
encompassed in the body (śarīra) of the Lord, 
is said to be controlled by the Lord, this 
immanent control would seem to threaten its 
moral autonomy.2 Rāmānuja replies that the 
Lord has equipped individuals with the 
instruments necessary for performing action 
(such as the organs of speech, the power of 
thought and willing) and remains within them 
as their support and inner controller, while 
with the help of these capacities individuals 
either perform or desist from action. We may 
take the analogous case of a carpenter who has 
at hand the necessary implements such as an 
axe but uses them only when they wish to 
work. We must at the same time, however, 
recognise the limitation of this analogy for 
while the carpenter is necessarily extrinsic to 
the tools used at work, the Lord resides within 
the embodied self as its inner controller in a 
way that does not take away its moral agency. 
When the finite self chooses to perform a 
certain act, the Lord, the embodied self’s 
metaphysical support, consents to its 
fulfilment, and without such permission 
(anumati) no action is possible. In the final 
analysis, we must affirm both that the Lord is 
the ultimate cause behind every action and 
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that nevertheless the finite self remains a 
moral agent. Thus, commenting on the 
scriptural text which states that it is the Lord 
who causes those whom the Lord wishes to 
lead upwards or downwards to perform good 
or bad actions respectively (Kauṣītaki 
Upaniṣad III, 8), Rāmānuja argues that the Lord 
favours those who perform actions as 
devotional worship and produces in them the 
desire (ruci) to perform more virtuous actions, 
while on the other hand, the Lord produces in 
those who are intent on violating the divine 
commands the desire to perform non-virtuous 
actions which will further hinder their 
progress towards the Lord.3 Therefore, in this 
case too the progress or the regress of the 
embodied self towards or away from the Lord 
is a consequence of its own prior actions for 
which it remains morally responsible. 
However, although all embodied selves 
are embraced by the divine body, not all of 
them are moving towards the Lord, and many 
are, in fact, overwhelmed with the burden of 
their past karma in the present life-time. It is 
only by withdrawing itself from the 
impermanence of the mutable prākṛtic world, 
including that of its own body, that the finite 
self gradually becomes more con-centrated in 
itself, and by realising its essential nature as 
the accessory (śeṣa) to the Lord it begins to see 
the whole phenomenal world as an unbroken 
reality pervaded by the Lord. In this process, 
by seeking refuge (prapaddi) in the Lord 
whose body it constitutes, it begins to perform 
all actions with the knowledge that it is the 
Lord who is the supreme agent behind them.4 
While the way back to the Lord through the 
perils of saṃsāra is not ‘predestined’ in a 
strong Augustinian-Calvinist sense, according 
to which certain individuals are timelessly 
elected to receive salvation, neither must it be 
understood as a ‘Pelagian’ self-striving 
unaided by the Lord, for Rāmānuja explains 
that only they whom the Lord chooses obtain 
the supreme goal, and the Lord strives to bring 
them, who are His beloved, to Him. Rāmānuja 
clearly states in one place in the 
Vedārthasaṃgraha that release from saṃsāra 
is not possible without resort to the supreme 
Lord.5 Regarding the supreme lovers of the 
Lord, the jñānins, Rāmānuja writes that it is 
the Lord Himself who chooses them and grants 
(dadāti) them the capacity to progress in their 
worship by removing from them all the 
obstacles that hinder the further increase of 
their devotion towards Himself.6  
The Kaṭha Upanisad I, 2, 23 is the basic 
scriptural text on which Rāmānuja builds his 
theology of the Lord’s grace (prasāda), which 
assists the embodied self on its journey 
towards liberation. Rāmānuja states that it 
declares that it is not possible for the finite self 
to attain the Lord through the mere hearing of 
scripture, reflection on it and meditation on it, 
for only they who have been chosen by the 
Lord shall obtain this supreme end, which is 
Himself. These ‘chosen’ people are beloved of 
the Lord, and it is the Lord Himself who strives 
to bring them to Him. Because of His favour, 
they begin to acquire a direct presentation of 
the Lord in their minds, and this is a steady 
remembrance dear above all things since the 
object of this remembrance is of such a nature. 
Such a steady remembrance of the Lord in 
those whom He has chosen is called devotion, 
and for Rāmānuja this is synonymous with 
worshipful meditation (upāsana). While the 
devotee’s meditative worship of the Lord is the 
cause of the devotee’s being chosen by the 
Lord, this worshipful ‘remembrance’ itself is 
aided by the Lord’s gracious choosing of the 
devotee.7 The devotees who seek the Lord 
alone will acquire moral qualities, perform 
‘good works’ as forms of worship, and through 
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devotion become absorbed in incessantly 
glorifying Him. They become completely 
dedicated to the most compassionate 
(paramakāruṇika-) Lord by taking refuge at 
His lotus-feet (śaraṇāgati-), and are assisted by 
His grace (prasāda) which dispels their 
ignorance. Thus, they are able to attain Him 
through their fervent devotion (bhakti) to 
Him.8 The supreme person, the reliever of the 
distress of supplicants, has stepped into the 
world out of supreme compassion and 
parental love for His devotees so that He may 
become a refuge for all.9 By seeking refuge 
(prapad-) in the Lord who will enable the 
selves to overcome their ignorance about the 
spiritual nature of the finite self, they shall be 
able to perform all actions easily until they 
attain perfection through His grace 
(prasāda).10     
(B) 
Rāmānuja thus presents Visnu as the 
supremely adorable deity who is the 
transcendental abode of all supereminent 
qualities, and who, as the inner controller 
(antaryāmī) in the embodied human self, is 
also intimately accessible to the devotee. J. B. 
Carman notes that a similar motif of a 
transcendent God who condescends to the 
depths of sinful humanity lies at the core of 
the theologies of various Christian figures, and 
writes: ‘We can feel in Christian faith the same 
tension that Rāmānuja senses in his 
apprehension of the Lord revealed to him in 
the Vedas and through the Vedānta and the 
Śrī Vaiṣṇava tradition. That tension is the 
inner dynamic of the supreme lordship and 
utter availability within the same Divine 
nature and the same Divine person. That is 
why, although Christians stand outside 
Rāmānuja’s tradition, they are able to grasp 
and appreciate so much of his thought.’11 Thus, 
Rāmānuja’s exegetical-theological struggles 
with the central theological paradox – of 
simultaneously affirming divine sovereignty 
and human freedom – can illuminate one of 
the most vexed debates in Christian theology, 
namely, whether divine grace infallibly moves 
the predestined soul to perform virtuous 
action, or whether divine grace is rendered 
efficacious by free human response. As a 
matter of fact, Rāmānuja’s own Śrī-Vaiṣṇava 
community split into two traditions after his 
death over the question of whether (a) 
Rāmānuja had primarily outlined a structured 
system of human karmic responses to the 
Lord’s gracious initiative or (b) Rāmānuja had 
advocated the complete renunciation of 
human agential capacity (prapatti) in the 
wake of the Lord’s offer of grace (prasāda) to 
worldly beings as an independent means 
towards final renunciation.12 Rāmānuja 
himself sought, as we have seen, to hold 
together two theses which also lie at the 
doctrinal core of the mainstream Christian 
traditions: (a) while human beings must 
(actively) work out their salvation in ‘fear and 
trembling’ (Philippians 2: 12); (b) without their 
(passive) reception of divine grace, they are 
incapable of seeking and finding God (John 5: 
15).  
What is distinctive about the Augustinian 
Christian theological problematic is a series of  
interlocking theses about divine atemporal 
eternity, the (utter) bondage of the human will 
due to original sin, and the divine timeless 
foreknowledge of human responses to God. 
The famous Augustinian resolution of 
numerous theological paradoxes is that the 
predestined are timelessly chosen not because 
they have already turned to God but in order 
that they may believe in the future.13 
Predestination, which is the timeless God’s 
(fore-)knowledge of what God is going to do, is 
therefore a preparation for grace (gratia), 
which follows as its effect.14  The eternal God 
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does not have to wait upon the created order 
in any manner and timelessly (fore-)knows 
those saints who will be resurrected into 
eternal life after the final judgement. God 
(fore-)knows the whole created order of 
causes in the universe and since the free 
choices of human beings, which are the causes 
of their specific actions, are themselves 
encompassed by this order, God timelessly 
(fore-)knows all their future actions in a 
manner that does not destroy their free 
agency. For example, when we (‘freely’) pray 
to God and God has mercy on us, it does not 
imply that God is now acting on some new 
motive in response to a temporal event (that 
is, our praying); rather, God timelessly  
(fore)knows that we shall, as a matter of fact, 
offer our prayers. Therefore, while Augustine 
asserts that human beings must make an 
active response to the divine offer, he also 
emphasises that the fact that God timelessly 
(fore-)knows that some of them shall in fact 
make this response does not detract from their 
free moral agency.15 However, although by 
being baptised into the body of Christ, 
predestined individuals have indeed entered a 
new existential state, their regeneration is not 
yet complete, and they are exhorted to 
constantly renew ‘the inner man’ (2 
Corinthians 4 : 16), while they wait, with hope, 
for the redemption of their bodies at the 
resurrection. In other words, Christians 
cannot slacken their efforts for even though it 
is the Spirit of God who is constantly leading 
them towards holiness, it is they themselves 
who must do the running. Thus, Augustine 
declares in a sermon that God is building up a 
temple with Christians as stones, but they are 
not dead pieces of matter to be passively 
thrown about but rather are ‘living stones’ 
who must actively cooperate with God in this 
construction.16 Therefore, the saints who have 
been timelessly predestined to receive saving 
grace are not coerced but are inclined to come 
to Christ for their wills have been ‘prepared’ 
by grace, and they are drawn to Christ in a 
manner that does not annihilate their free 
choice of will. A child who loves nuts will come 
running to a person who is offering them, this 
very love giving the child the strength to run; 
similarly, God has shaped the hearts of the 
elect to love God, and God sweetly appeals to 
these saints to accept the divine offer.17 The 
omniscient God has the timeless 
(fore)knowledge of what human beings will 
freely choose to do under which conditions, 
and by presenting the elect with specifically 
those inclinations and motives that God 
(fore)knows to be congruent with their 
circumstances, God brings them to become 
faithful and holy.18 
(C) 
While Augustine did not – as it is 
sometimes claimed – deny that human beings 
have free will (liberum arbitrium), by 
insisting, however, that the temporal 
beginning (initium) of faith itself is a gift of 
God, he bequeathed to Christendom a question 
of momentous proportions: is the will’s first 
movement towards God founded on its own 
(natural) resources or is this return 
foreordained within God’s (supernatural) 
gracious economy? While Rāmānuja’s 
devotional universe too is shaped by the 
simultaneous assertion of divine control and 
human autonomy, the pointed Augustinian 
question does not arise on his horizons partly 
because these are shaped by the doctrine of 
karma and rebirth, which operate in a 
beginningless (anādi) universe. Even if people 
following the discipline of works do not attain 
liberation in this birth, they will regain in the 
subsequent birth the mental disposition with 
which they have been performing actions in 
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this birth. Consequently, like someone who 
has just woken up from sleep, they will carry 
on from where they had left off and strive once 
again for complete success.19 Thus,  since the 
cycles of re-embodiment do not have a 
temporal origination, the vexed theme – one 
volatile source of Christian divisions during 
and after the European Reformation – relating 
to the spiritual dynamics of the first moment 
does not appear in Rāmānuja’s theological 
commentaries. Rather, divine gracious 
presence and human agency are 
beginninglessly so densely entangled that 
they cannot be neatly separated.20 In the 
Augustinian worldview, in contrast, there is 
no ‘before’ to the present lifetime, so that the 
question of whether the first turning towards 
God is directed by human effort or inspired by 
divine grace becomes a vexed conundrum. The 
former possibility would seem to negate 
Christ’s saying, ‘Without me ye can do 
nothing’ (John 25:5), which is constantly used 
by Augustine as one of his proof-texts for the 
necessity of grace as a divine aid (adiutorium 
Dei). The second possibility would invoke the 
spectre of a theological determinism where 
human volition is drawn to God with an 
‘irresistible’ compulsion. This dilemma clearly 
shapes Augustine’s exegetical struggles with 
Biblical data such as God’s love of Jacob and 
hatred of Esau (Malachi 1:2-3: Romans 9:13) 
even before the twin brothers were born, from 
within his Christian framework of a linear 
symbolism of time according to which human 
beings have only one life on earth. Rāmānuja, 
however, would argue that the various 
inequalities (mental, socio-economic, moral 
dispositions, and so on) that we see in the 
phenomenal world are, on the one hand, not 
predetermined by the Lord in an Augustinian 
sense, and are, on the other hand, not random 
happenings either. Because of the 
beginningless nature of the stream of karma 
he can maintain that the empirical 
distinctions in each new world-order are a 
recompense for the non-annihilated karma, 
handed over from the previous ones, of finite 
beings.21  
What, then, might Christian theologians 
learn through a careful exploration of 
Rāmānuja’s theological terrain? The doctrine 
of creation ex nihilo is sometimes understood 
as teaching the world’s temporal origination, 
which only foregrounds the vexed question: 
which arrives first, unmerited divine grace or 
free human response? In some sectors of 
Catholic doctrine, the world is placed under 
the sign of a ‘pure nature’, which is then 
sharply contrasted in an extrinsic sense with 
the subsequently superadded dimension of 
the ‘grace’ of divine creativity. Because nature 
is regarded as a self-sufficient realm that is not 
‘always already’ orientated towards God, grace 
appears as an external superstructure which is 
imposed on the former, with the implication 
that until an individual experiences grace 
through the verbal revelation preached by the 
Church, she remains locked into a state of pure 
nature.22 Such an understanding of creation ex 
nihilo motivates the claim that an initial state 
of the corrupted human will, belonging to a 
pure nature, is succeeded by divine grace, 
which generates the extremely subtle – and 
seemingly interminable – scholastic 
disquisitions on the temporal relation 
between divine foreknowledge of future 
contingents and human responses. However, 
if the doctrine of creation is instead read as 
emphasising the utter  metaphysical-
existential dependence of the world on Christ, 
it could shift the theological focus away from 
a temporal priority of grace over freewill (or 
vice versa), towards a mystical priority of 
grace which ineffably ‘encapsulates’ human 
agency.23 Cyril Veliath, S.J. writes in this vein 
that the ‘antinomy that exists between the 
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agency of the individual Atman and that of the 
Brahman … stands a better chance of 
acceptance when observed not from a 
metaphysical but from a Mystical point of 
view.… When viewed from such a perspective 
therefore, it is of little consequence to 
consider whether the agent be the Atman or 
the Brahman, for in the ultimate perspective 
there is nothing else but the Brahman, and any 
individual that the Atman may possess is 
wholly due to the Brahman alone …’24 Veliath’s 
view is echoed more recently by Martin 
Ganeri, O.P. who writes that the polarities of 
divine grace and free will in Rāmānuja are  ‘to 
some extent … the common ones that abide in 
such theistic accounts in  many traditions and 
mark the limits of human reason to make 
sense of realities that transcend them’.25 
To understand the themes of ‘mystical’ 
and ‘polarity’ in this context, we may highlight 
two radically distinct types of distinction 
which are involved in the vexed debates 
relating to divine grace and human response. 
On the one hand, we observe various forms of 
empirical distinctions in the everyday world 
between, say, these chairs and those tables, 
one chair here and another chair there, and 
one book yesterday and the same book today. 
On the other hand, the ‘distinction’ between 
God and the world cannot be spelled out in this 
manner in terms of spatio-temporal relations, 
for God is not another object who stands in 
contradistinction to the world: God is being-
itself who is the ground of the world’s 
existence at every moment. Therefore, the 
‘distinction’ between God and the human 
devotee should not be viewed in terms of two 
(quasi-finite) individuals – one, a faultless 
grandmaster and another, a paltry novice – 
who are competing with each other to weave 
a carpet from two opposite ends. Such 
‘synergistic’ images invoke dilemmas such as: 
‘If the novice abandons all self-effort, how can 
the novice progress towards perfection? But if 
the novice does not abandon all self-effort, 
would not this assertion of autonomy be an 
affront to the sovereignty of the master?’ Such 
metaphors, in effect, domesticate divine 
transcendence, and lead to the perception that 
divine sovereignty is related to human 
freedom in a ‘zero-sum game’ such that 
highlighting the former can only entail the 
negation of the latter.26  The way through this 
dilemma is to remind ourselves that God and 
the world are not related as two ‘distinct’ 
enumerable powers in the sense that one 
entity – the grandmaster – works with another 
isolable entity – the novice, but in the sense 
that the one ineffable reality of the creator 
God mystically envelopes, encapsulates, and 
encompasses the finite being of the world to 
which God remains graciously bound in 
relations of polarity. While a distinct temporal 
origination (say, 14 billion years ago) has often 
been associated with creation ex nihilo, it has 
also been argued that the core of this doctrine 
is, in truth, the notion of existential 
dependence of the world on God.27 In this 
understanding, then, God is ‘prior’ to the 
world not primarily in a temporal sense but in 
the ontological sense that God remains the 
gracious fund of being who sustains human 
beings on their return to their transcendental 
home. 
In the light of our discussion, we may turn 
to the  Congregatio de Auxiliis which was 
established by Pope Clement VIII (1597) to 
examine the highly scholastic debates 
between the Dominicans and the Jesuits: they 
furiously disputed the point whether grace is 
efficacious because of the nature of grace itself 
or because of divine (timeless) omniscience of 
how human beings would respond to offered 
graces.28 Finally, Pope Paul V (1607) gave his 
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decision not by stating what the Roman 
Catholic position is but by sketching the 
contours of what it is not – thus, the Jesuits are 
not ‘Pelagians’, the Dominicans are not 
‘Calvinists’, and each side should cease to 
slander the other as heretics. The Pope’s 
apophatic via media could be seen as an 
assertion of the ‘mystical’ priority of God’s 
providential care over human response – in a 
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